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Abstract
An interrelationship between Game Theory and Control Theory is
seeked. In this respect two aspects of this relationship are brought up.
To establish the direct relationship Control Based Games and to es-
tablish the inverse relationship Game Based Control are discussed. In
the attempt to establish the direct relationship Control Based Boolean
Networks are discussed with the novel technique of application of Semi
Tensor Product of matrices in Differential Calculus. For the inverse
relationship H∞ robust optimal control has been discussed with the
help of Dynamic Programming and Pontryagin Minimization Princi-
ple.
Keywords: Dynamic Game, Boolean Network, Semi Ten-
sor Product, H∞ control, Riccati Equation, Pontryagin Min-
imization Principle
1 Introduction
Game Theory as developed by Von Neumann and John Nash during the
early 30’s saw its first incarnation in static form without any consideration
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of involvement of temporal parameters. This was what the game between
two players was represented in static bimatrix or normal form. But with the
passage of decades the need for introduction of time parameter was felt in
game theory which led to the development of dynamic game theory which
can be pictorially represented in extensive form or a game tree evolving with
the passage of time. With the flow of evolutionary ideas in game theory
and the birth of Evolutionary Game Theory the need for a time parameter
in the existing theory was felt more acute. Also the number of players were
thought to be couldnot be limited in two but taking into account involvement
of an arbitrary number of players in a particular game. As time became an
indispensable component in the existing theory, there were ideas to capture
the time evolution of the game in terms of differential(for continous time) or
difference(for discrete time) equations. And in this respect the most perfect
idea was to borrow theories from Control Theory which was developed on
the pillars of differential equations of time. And it brought the merging
of two theories the Game Theory and the Control Theory. The last two
decades saw an extensive application of Mathematical Control Theory in
Game Theory and now it is thought that they both complement each other
for the develpoment of a more robust theory where one of theories is assumed
to be incomplete without the other.
There is a two way road between Game Theory and Control Theory where
juggling of ideas continue between the two theories. On one hand there is
application of concepts of Control Theory in Game Theory which is known
as Control based Games and on the other hand application of concepts of
Game Theory to approach problems in Control Theory which is known as
Game based Control. In Evolutionary Games the whole game is pictorially
represented as a network graph where each node of the graph represents a
species whose time evolution should be studied. In more simplified language
it is the time evolution of each node of the graph which changes its state
with the passage of time. In some seminal works[1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8] Cheng
and his collaborators showed that the network describing the game can be
thought of a boolean network where the nodes changes its state between 0
and 1 as a response after each interaction with its neighboring nodes. In
this develpoment it was primarily considered that a node can respond and
change its state only with the nodes with which it is edge connected and not
between distant nodes. As a more complicated scenario k valued networks[9]
can also exist where each node can take k different values instead of only two
values that is 0 and 1. But in our work we restrict ourself to only boolean
2
networks. In this respect we seek to apply the mathematical ideas of semi
tensor product to analyse boolean networks as introduced by Cheng and his
collaborators[10, 11, 12, 13]. This is a picture of how Control Theory was
involved to tackle the problems of modern Game Theory[14]. As already
mentioned it is a two way road between the two theories there is another
aspect of it. That is how Game Theory got its application to approach the
problems of modern Control Theory. Game Theory finds a direct application
in H∞ robust control[15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21]. H∞ robust control[22] is
concerned with design of suitable control parameters which is most suited
for a particular plant to withstand the adverse effects of natural hazards or
measurement noise which may interfere with the operation of the plant. Here
two players are considered, the controller and the nature. And thus there are
two inputs one in the form of control and another in the form of cumulative
adverse effects which the plant has to withstand. It borrows the formalism of
state variable approach from Control Theory[23]. The aim of the controller
is to design a perfect control to maximize the performance index of the plant
in worst case scenario of the adverse effects which nature may inflict on
the plant. Thus it is a competitive game between the controller and nature
where controller wishes to maximize the performance index and nature tries
to minimize it through its adverse effects. Thus it reduces to a min-max
optimization problem[24]. In two− person− zero− sum games also we are
confronted with such a min-max optimization problem. The optimum point
is the saddle point of the optimization which is also the Nash Equilibrium in
terms of Game Theoretic concepts. So it seems natural to use the ideas and
tools of two− person− zero− sum game in H∞ robust control.
In our quest to establish a interrelationship between the two apparently
disconnected theories we take up Control Based Games in the first part of our
discussion. There we introduce an absolutely novel technique in implement-
ing the Semi-Tensor product formalism in Markov Decision Process(MDP)
dynamics[25, 26, 27]. There we derive the Bellman Optimality Equation
for Boolean networks where we successfully applied the properties of Semi-
Tensor product while doing the differential calculus. Finally we arrive at the
computation of optimal control by considering a value of state trajectory.
In the second part of the discussion we have dealt with H∞ optimal control
for discrete time systems[28]. By considering the dynamic programming for
discrete time systems we state the Pontryagin Minimization Principle [29]
for the same and also present a thought problem in the form of a proposi-
tion. While computing the optimal control, we adopted an absolutely new
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technique of doing the delta(∆) variations of the state equation and eventu-
ally replacing the delta variations by differentials which made the equations
much simpler. The matrix Riccati equations[30, 31] which came up in this
process were solved successfully for some numerical values of the matrices.
Finally we calculate the spectral radius and through the condition on the
attenuation level γ we attempt to calculate a range for γ.
2 Basic Idea and our Approach
While dealing with the first part of our discussion that is Control Based
Games we consider the representation of the game as a network graph. We
assume it is a Boolean network and apply the formalism of semi tensor prod-
uct(STP) as introduced by Cheng and his collaborators. STP approach which
is generalisation of conventional matrix product uses STP to express a log-
ical equation into matrix form which makes it possible to convert a logical
dynamic system into a discrete time system. In the next section while intro-
ducing the basic notation we do a brief review of STP formalism. In Network
Evolutionary Games(NEG) a key issue is the strategy updating rule. That is,
how a player chooses his strategy based on his information about his neigh-
borhood players. We try to capture the time evolution of the strategies of
individual nodes in discrete time by equating its state in t + 1 th interval
depending on its state at t th interval with a matrix equation.
While dealing with the second part of our discussion that is Game Based
Control our prime motivation is to show the application of two-person-zero-
sum-game in the problem of H∞ optimal control. The main idea goes like
the following:
Given a plant y = Gu devise a feedback control u = Ky which shall make
the sensitivity transfer function T = (I + GK)−1 small in order to be ro-
bust. Here ”small” refers to the maximum value of the norm of T (iw) over
all frequencies, i.e. the H∞ norm of T has to lie in the Hardy Space H∞ in
order that the closed loop system to be stable. Further, for measurement of
noise insensitivity it is desired that the complementary sensitivity function
Tc = GK(I + GK)
−1 also be small. However, since T + Tc = 1, it is impos-
sible to make both small at the same time. The solution to this problem is
to realize that modelling errors introduce low frequency disturbances while
measurement errors tend to be high frequency. Thus one attempts to control
the magnitude of T at low frequencies and that of Tc at high frequencies.
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When the standard solution to this problem was expressed in terms of Ric-
cati Equations it was realised that the problem could be stated in terms of
min − max linear quadratic problem which forms the basic foundation of
the problem formulation and its solution, as we will see in our subsequent
discussions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows:
We broadly divide the paper into two sections, one dedicated for the direct
and the other, the inverse relationship[32, 33, 34] that exists between Game
Theory and Control Theory. Then in individual sections we introduce the
basic and necessary mathematical structure that we are going to follow along
with the problem describition and its solution. Finally we conclude with some
open problems.
I. CONTROL BASED GAMES
3 Formulation of Networked Evolutionary Games
3.1 Important Notations and basic formalism
1. Mm×n is the set of m× n real matrices.
2. Coli(M) is the i-th column of matrix M ;Col(M) is the set of columns of
M .
3. Dk := 1, 2, . . . , k
4. δin :=Coli(In) i.e. it is the i-th column of the identity matrix.
5. ∆ :=Col(In)
6. M ∈ Mm×n is called a logical matrix if Col(M) ⊂ ∆m the set of m × n
logical functions is denoted by Lm×n
7. Assume L ∈ Lm×n, then
L = [δi1m δ
i2
m . . . δ
in
m ]
; and its shorthand form is
L = δm[i1 i2 . . . in]
8. A k dimensional vector with all entries equal to 1 is denoted by
1k := (1 . . . 1)
T
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9. A ⋉ B is the semi-tensor product(STP) of two matrices A and B. The
symbol ⋉ is mostly omitted and we express
AB := A⋉ B
Here we take the opportunity to briefly introduce the definition of STP.
Definition 1. Let A ∈ Mm×n and B ∈ Mp×q. Denote by t :=lcm(n, p).
Then we define the semi-tensor product(STP) of A and B as
A⋉B := (A⊗ I t
n
)(B ⊗ I t
p
) ∈ M(mt
n
)×( qt
p
) (1)
It is to be noted when n = p, A⋉B = AB. So the STP is a generalisation
of conventional matrix product. STP keeps almost all the major properties
of the conventional matrix product unchanged.
We discuss some basic properties of STP.
a. Associative Law :
A⋉ (B ⋉ C) = (A⋉B)⋉ C (2)
b. Distributive Law :
(A+B)⋉ C = A⋉ C +B ⋉ C
A⋉ (B + C) = A⋉ B + A⋉ C
(3)
c. Transpose :
(A⋉B)T = BT ⋉ AT (4)
d. Inverse:
If A and B are invertible then
(A⋉B)−1 = B−1 ⋉A−1 (5)
e. Let X ∈ Rt be a column vector. Then for matrix M
X ⋉M = (It ⊗M)⋉X (6)
10. Let f : Bn → B be a boolean function expressed as
y = f(x1, . . . , xn) (7)
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where B = {0, 1}. Identifying
1 = δ12 = [1 0]
T , 0 = δ22 = [0 1]
T (8)
Then there exists a unique logical matrix Mf ∈ L2×2n called the structure
matrix of f such that under vector form by using (8), (7) can be expressed
as
y =Mf ⋉
n
i=1 xi (9)
which is called the algebraic form of (7).
4 Markov Decision Process in Boolean Net-
works
We introduce an absolutely novel approach to implement the ideas of Markov
Decision Process(MDP) which is a variant of Reinforcement Learning as a
new technique in Boolean Networks.
4.1 Markov Decision Process(MDP) dynamics for dis-
crete time systems
Consider the discrete time Linear Quadratic Regulator(LQR) problem where
MDP satisfies the state transition equation
xk+1 = Axk +Buk (10)
where xk ∈ X = R
n, the state space and uk ∈ U = R
m, the control space. A
and B are matrices of appropriate dimensions and k being the discrete time
index.
The infinite horizon performance index is given by
Jk =
1
2
∞∑
i=k
(xTi Qxi − u
T
i Rui) (11)
where the cost weighting matrices satisfy Q = QT ≥ 0 and R = RT > 0.
a. Bellman equation for discrete time LQR, the Lyapunov Equa-
tion:
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The controls are assumed to be the policies adopted by the players in the
network. For a policy uk = µk at k th time the associated value function is
given by
V (xk) =
1
2
∞∑
i=k
(xTi Qxi − u
T
i Rui)
=
1
2
(xTkQxk − u
T
kRuk) +
1
2
∞∑
i=k+1
(xTi Qxi − u
T
i Rui)
=
1
2
(xTkQxk − u
T
kRuk) + V (xk+1)
(12)
Assuming the cost is quadratic so that V (xk) =
1
2
xTk Pxk for some kernel
matrix P > 0 yields the Bellman equation
2V (xk) = x
T
kPxk = x
T
kQxk − u
T
kRuk + x
T
k+1Pxk+1 (13)
Proposition 1. The matrix P in equation (13) is symmetric that is P = P T
Proof. From equation (13) we have
xTk Pxk = x
T
kQxk − u
T
kRuk + x
T
k+1Pxk+1 (14)
Taking the transpose of equation (14) we have
xTk P
Txk = x
T
kQ
Txk − u
T
kR
Tuk + x
T
k+1P
Txk+1
= xTkQxk − u
T
kRuk + x
T
k+1P
Txk+1 [∵ Q = Q
T , R = RT ]
(15)
Subtracting equation (14) from (15) we have
xTk (P − P
T )xk = x
T
k+1(P − P
T )xk+1 (16)
Now as this equation is true for any xk and xk+1 we should have
P − P T = 0
=⇒ P = P T
(17)
i.e. P is symmetric.
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b. Bellman optimality equation for discrete time LQR:
The discrete time LQR Hamiltonian function is given by
H(xk, uk) = x
T
kQxk − u
T
kRuk + x
T
k+1Pxk+1 − x
T
k Pxk
= xTkQxk − u
T
kRuk + (Axk +Buk)
TP (Axk +Buk)− x
T
kPxk
[Replacing xk+1 from equation (10)]
(18)
If u⋆k stands for optimal control with (⋆) signifying the condition for optimal-
ity we have
∂H
∂u⋆k
= 0 (19)
Solving the above equation gives the optimal control as
u⋆k = −(B
TPB −R)−1BTPAx⋆k (20)
where x⋆k stands for the trajectory in optimal condition.
4.2 Markov Decision Process for Boolean Networks
We try to adopt the formalism of MDP for discrete time system for Boolean
Control Networks. Let the system consists of n states and m controls which
are represented by the nodes of the Boolean network. We write xk = ⋉
n
i=1x
i
k
and uk = ⋉
m
j=1u
j
k. Then the state updation law is given by
xk+1 = L⋉ uk ⋉ xk
= Lukxk [Where the notations for STP are omitted for convenience]
where L is known as the state transition matrix
(21)
a. Bellman optimality equation for Boolean Networks:
The discrete time LQR Hamiltonian function is given by
H(xk, uk) = x
T
kQxk − u
T
kRuk + x
T
k+1Pxk+1 − x
T
k Pxk (22)
If u⋆k denotes the optimal control we should have
∂H
∂u⋆k
= 0 (23)
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Doing the partial derivative of equation (22) with respect to uk and setting
it to 0 we have
− 2u⋆Tk R + 2x
⋆T
k+1P
∂x⋆k+1
∂u⋆k
= 0
− 2u⋆Tk R + 2x
⋆T
k u
⋆T
k L
TPx⋆kL = 0
(24)
Where the products are understood as STP. We replaced the value of xk+1
and have taken its partial derivative with respect to uk. u
⋆
k and x
⋆
k denotes
the optimal control and optimal trajectory respectively.
Simplifying equation(24) we have
u⋆Tk R = x
⋆T
k u
⋆T
k L
TPx⋆kL
u⋆Tk = x
⋆T
k u
⋆T
k L
TPx⋆kLR
−1
(25)
Now P is a symmetric matrix and R is also a symmetric matrix. Without loss
of generality we can assume P = I2n(Identity matrix of dimension 2
n × 2n)
and R−1 = R = I2m(Identity matrix of dimension 2
m × 2m).
Then equation (25) simplifies to
u⋆Tk = x
⋆T
k u
⋆T
k L
Tx⋆kL (26)
Taking the transpose of equation (26) we have
u⋆k = L
Tx⋆Tk Lu
⋆
kx
⋆
k (27)
We assume x⋆k = δ
i
2n and with no loss of generality L = (δ
i
2m)
T .
Then the above equation reduces to
u⋆k = (δ
i
2m)(δ
i
2n)
T (δi2m)
Tu⋆k(δ
i
2n) (28)
Where all the above products are understood to be STP.
Proposition 2. There exists a unique u⋆k of matrix dimension 2
m× 1 which
satisfies equation(28).
Proof. uk is the STP of m controls uk = ⋉
m
j=1u
j
k. Thus it is a vector of
dimension 2m × 1. We try to compute the matrix dimension of resultant
matrix of the STP at the R.H.S. of equation (28). Let us take two terms
in the R.H.S of equation (28), find the STP and again do the STP with the
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third terms and so on as STP is associative. Dimensions of: δi2m = 2
m × 1,
(δi2n)
T = 1× 2n, (δi2m)
T = 1× 2m, u⋆k = 2
m × 1, δi2n = 2
n × 1.
Doing the STP of first two terms generates a matrix of dimension 2m ×
2n. Taking STP of this matrix with the third term generates a matrix of
dimension 2m × 2m+n. Taking the STP of this matrix with the fourth term
generates a matrix of dimension 2m × 2n. Taking the STP of this matrix
with the last term generates a matrix of dimension 2m × 1. So we see the
resultant matrix of the R.H.S of equation (28) is of dimension 2m × 1. The
L.H.S of the same equation is also a matrix of dimension 2m × 1. As the
matrix dimensions match in L.H.S and R.H.S we can say the unique matrix
u⋆k exists.
a. Determination of u⋆k: By deep inspection and a tedious calculation
we arrive at the value of u⋆k as u
⋆
k = δ
i
2m .
b. Determination of optimal control and optimal trajectory: We
have from equation (21),
xk+1 = Lukxk
In optimal condition the above equation takes the form
x⋆k+1 = Lu
⋆
kx
⋆
k
Replacing the value of k with 0, 1, . . . and so on we have,
x⋆1 = Lu
⋆
0x
⋆
0
x⋆2 = Lu
⋆
1x
⋆
1
x⋆3 = Lu
⋆
2x
⋆
2
...
and so on
Puting u⋆0 = δ
i
2m , x
⋆
0 = δ
i
2n , L = (δ
i
2m)
T we evaluate x⋆1 as x
⋆
1 = δ
i
2n . From
equation (27), we can say x⋆1 = δ
i
2n will generate u
⋆
1 = δ
i
2m . So we see in
optimal condition the values are repeated for xk and uk for each discrete
time indexed by k. So we can say that the system falls into a cycle of length
1 where the values are repeated over each discrete time. Such a cycle is called
a fixed point.
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II. GAME BASED CONTROL
Now we turn our attention for an attempt to try to show how the inverse
relationship exists between Game Theory and Control Theory where solu-
tions to problems of Control Theory are dictated by the principles of Game
Theory. We pick up a unique aspect of this relationship for our attempt
to show this inverse relationship. Game theory has profound and successful
application to tackle the problems of H∞ robust optimal control. The basic
idea accompanying this attempt is given in the subsequent sections.
5 Problem Identification and probable solu-
tion
5.1 Min-max problems in robust control
Let U be a decision space and W a disturbance space. Let J : U × V → R
depending on decision u ∈ U and on an unknown disturbance w ∈ W . The
decision maker, choosing u that is the control wants to make J as small as
possible in spite of the a priori unknown disturbance w ∈ W . Then the
guranteed performance of a given decision u ∈ U is any number g such that
J(u, w) < g, ∀w ∈ W
Clearly, the best guaranteed performance for a given decision u is
G(u) = sup
w∈W
J(u, w)
Now, the problem of finding the best possible decision in this context is to
find the smallest guaranteed performance, or
inf
u∈U
G(u) = inf
u∈U
sup
w∈W
J(u, w) (29)
If the infimum in u is reached, then the minimizing decision u⋆ is called the
optimal decision or the optimal control.
Let U and V be normed vector spaces Z be an auxiliary normed vector space
z ∈ Z the output whose norm is to be kept small in spite of the disturbances
w. We assume that for each decision u ∈ U , z depends lineraly on w.
Therefore there is a nonlinear application P : U → L(W → Z) and
z = P (u)w
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Clearly z cannot be kept bounded if w is not. A natural formalization of the
problem of keeping it small is to try and make the operator norm of P (u)
as small as possible. In terms of guaranteed performance ||P (u)|| ≤ γ for a
given postive attenuation level γ. This is equivalent to
||z|| ≤ γ||w||, w ∈ W
or equivalently ||z||2 ≤ γ2||w||2, w ∈ W
or equivaletly again, sup
w∈W
[||P (u)w||2 − γ2||w||2] ≤ 0
(30)
Now, given a number, γ, this has a solution that is there exists a decision
u ∈ U satisfying that inequality if the infimum hereafter is reached or is
negative, and only if
inf
u∈U
sup
w∈W
[||P (u)w||2 − γ2||w||2] ≤ 0 (31)
This is the method of H∞ optimal control.
6 H∞ optimal control
Given a linear system with inputs u and w and a desired attenuation level γ
we want to know whether there exist causal control laws satisfying inequality
(30) and if yes, find one. This is the standard problem of H∞ optimal control.
We propose here an approach of this problem based upon dynamic game
theory. Since we have been dealing with discrete time systems from the
beginning this discussion is also restricted to discrete time systems though it
can be formulated equivalently in continous time.
6.1 Discrete Time
We consider now the discrete-time system where t ∈ N:
xt+1 = Atxt +Btut +Dtwt, xt0 = x0 (32)
yt = Ctxt + Etwt (33)
zt = Htxt +Gtut (34)
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where the system matrices may depend on the time t. Then we want to
optimize the performance index given by[35]
J = ||xt1 ||
2 +
t1−1∑
t=t0
(||zt||
2 − γ2||wt||
2)− γ2||x0||
2 (35)
We introduce the following notations
A¯t = At − BtR
−1
t P
T
t , A˜t = At − L
T
t N
−1
t Ct (36)
where Rt = G
T
t Gt, Pt = H
T
t Gt, Lt = EtD
T
t , Nt = EtE
T
t .
Along with the additional notations
Γt = (S
−1
t+1 +BtR
−1
t B
T
t − γ
−2Mt)
−1
S¯t = A¯
T
t (St+1 − γ
−2Mt)
−1A¯t +Qt − PtR
−1
t P
T
t
∆t = (Σ
−1
t + C
T
t NtCt − γ
−2Qt)
−1
Σ˜t+1 = A˜t(Σ
−1
t − γ
−2Qt)
−1A˜Tt +Mt − L
T
t N
−1
t Lt
(37)
Then the two matrix Riccati equations needed for our purpose can be written
as
St = A¯
T
t ΓtA¯t +Qt − PtR
−1
t P
T
t (38)
Σt+1 = A˜t∆tA˜
T
t +Mt − L
T
t N
−1
t Lt (39)
where Qt = H
T
t Ht, Mt = DtD
T
t
6.1.1 Computation of Optimal Control For Infinite Horizon Case
Here we deal with the special case of discrete time system along with infinite
horizon that is the end time is infinity. This problem is known as infinite
horizon stationary problem. The matrices are no longer time dependent and
the dynamics is to be understood with zero initial condition at −∞. The
criterion (35) is replaced by a sum from−∞ to∞ with no initial and terminal
terms.
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Throwing the problem in the formalism of Pontryagin Minimization Principle
we have,
J =
∞∑
t=−∞
(||zt||
2 − γ2||wt||
2)
=
∞∑
t=−∞
(zTt zt − γ
2wTt wt)
(40)
The Hamiltonian is given by,
H = (zTt zt − γ
2wTt wt) + p
T
t (Axt +But +Dwt) [Since matrices are time independent]
= xTt H
THxt + x
T
t H
TGut + u
T
t G
THxt + u
T
t G
TGut − γ
2wTt wt + p
T
t (Axt +But +Dwt)
(41)
Minimizing the Hamiltonian with respect to the control u we have,
0 =
∂H
∂ut
= 2xtH
TH
∂xt
∂ut
+ 2uTt G
TH
∂xt
∂ut
+ 2xTt H
TG+ 2uTt G
TG+ pTt A
∂xt
∂ut
+ pTt B
(42)
We consider partials of the xt with respect to ut because state is dependent
on control.
To evaluate the partials we adopt the following strategy.
We have,
xt+1 = Axt +But +Dwt
xt = Axt−1 +But−1 +Dwt−1
Subtracting one from the other we have
∆xt = A∆xt +B∆ut +D∆wt
=⇒ [I −A]∆xt = B∆ut +D∆wt
=⇒ [I −A]
∆xt
∆ut
= B +D
∆wt
∆ut
(43)
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Replacing the ∆ variations with ∂ that is differentials we have,
[I −A]
∂xt
∂ut
= B +D
∂wt
∂ut
(44)
Now the controls ut and wt are independent. Therefore
∂wt
∂ut
= 0 and we get
the above equation as,
∂xt
∂ut
= [I −A]−1B (45)
Puting this in equation (42) and simplifying we have,
2xTt H
TH [I − A]−1B + 2xTt H
TG + 2uTt G
TG+ 2uTt G
TH [I − A]−1B + pTt
[
A[I −A]−1 + I
]
B = 0
(46)
Using Woodbury matrix identity we have the above equation as
2xTt H
TH [I − A]−1B + 2xTt H
TG + 2uTt G
TG+ 2uTt G
TH [I − A]−1B + pTt [I − A]
−1B = 0
(47)
The adjoint equation is given by,
−pTt+1 =
∂H
∂xt
= 2xTt H
TH + 2uTt G
TH + pTt A
(48)
Now from transversality condition pt+1 = 0.
Therefore,
2xTt H
TH + 2uTt G
TH + pTt A = 0
=⇒ pTt = −2(x
T
t H
TH + uTt G
TH)A−1
(49)
Puting the value of pTt in equation (47) and simplying we have,
xTt H
TH [I − A]−1B + xTt H
TG + uTt G
TG+ uTt G
TH [I − A]−1B
− (xTt H
TH + uTt G
TH)A−1[I − A]−1B = 0
(50)
Simplifying the above equation we have,
uTt
[
GTG +GTH [I − A−1][I − A]−1B
]
= −xTt
[
HTH [I −A−1][I − A]−1B +HTG
]
(51)
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Taking transpose of the above equation and solving for u we have,
ut = −
[
GTG+BT [I −AT ]−1[I − (AT )
−1
HTG]
]
−1 [
BT [I −AT ]−1[I − (AT )
−1
HTH ]
]
xt
(52)
The above equation points towards the condition of optimality. So it can be
written more meaningfully as,
u⋆t = −
[
GTG+BT [I − AT ]−1[I − (AT )
−1
HTG]
]
−1 [
BT [I −AT ]−1[I − (AT )
−1
HTH ]
]
x⋆t
(53)
Here we take a little digression to steer the path of discussion in a new
direction discussing about Dynamic Programming which is based on princi-
ples of optimality and the concept of Nash Equilibrium at the Optimal point.
We also propose a thought problem very much relevant to this context.
7 Dynamic Programming for Discrete Time
Systems
The method of dynamic programming is based on Principle of Optimality.
which states that an optimal strategy has the property that, whatever the
initial state and time are, all remaining decisions (from that particular initial
state and particular initial time onwards) must also constitute an optimal
strategy. To exploit this principle, we work backwards in time, starting at
all possible final states with the corresponding final times. We now discuss
the principle of optimality within the context of discrete-time systems but
with only one player (n = 1), but it can be generalised for (n = N) players.
The discrete time state updation law and the cost function is given by
xt+1 = ft(xt, ut), ut ∈ U(Control Space)
J(u) =
t=T∑
t=1
gt(xt+1, ut, xt)
(54)
In order to determine the minimizing control strategy, we shall need the
expression for the minimum cost from any starting point at any initial time.
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This is also called the value function and is defined as
V (t, x) = min
ut∈U
[
T∑
t=t0
gt(xt+1, ut, xt)
]
A direct application of the principle of optimality now readily leads to the
recursive relation
V (t, x) = min
ut∈U
[gt(ft(x, ut), ut, x) + V (t+ 1, ft(x, ut)] (55)
It is clear that V (1, x) = J(u⋆) where u⋆ is the optimal control. The point
where this condition for optimality occurs is also the Nash Equilibrium of the
game. Now we generalise the number of players to N to state the following
theorem. As it is a standard optimal control theorem it is stated without
proof to refrain from delving into lengthy standard calculations.
Theorem 1. For an N person discrete time infinite dynamic game let,
(i) ft(u
1
t . . . u
N
t ) be continously differentiable on R
n
(ii) git(u
i
t . . . u
N
t ) be continously differentiable on R
n × Rn, i ∈ n.
Then if u⋆it provides a Nash Equilibrium solution and x
⋆
t the corresponding
state trajectory, there exists a finite sequence of n dimensional costate vectors
(pi2 . . . p
i
t+1) for each i ∈ n such that the following relations are satisfied.
x⋆t+1 = ft(x
⋆
t , u
1
t . . . u
N
t ), x
⋆
1 = x1
ui⋆t = argmin
ut
H it(p
i
t+1, u
1⋆
t . . . u
N⋆
t , x
⋆
t )
pit =
∂
∂xt
fTt
(
x⋆t , u
1⋆
t . . . u
N⋆
t
) [
pit+1 +
(
∂
∂xt+1
git
(
x⋆t+1, u
1⋆
t . . . u
N⋆
t , x
⋆
t
))T]
+
[
∂
∂xt
git
(
xit+1, u
1
t . . . u
N
t , x
⋆
t
)]T
piT+1 = 0, i ∈ n
(56)
where
H it
(
pt+1, u
1
t . . . u
N
t .xt
)
= git
(
ft
(
xt, u
1
t . . . u
N
t
)
, u1t . . . u
N
t , xt
)
+piTt+1ft
(
xt, u
1
t . . . u
N
t
)
; i ∈ n
This set of equations is called Pontryagin Minimization Principle.
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At this point we state the thought problem and also attempt to give its
solution. As mentioned previously the point of optimality is also the Nash
Equilibrium, we give the problem describition as a proposition below.
Proposition 3. Consider the discrete time optimal control problem described
by the following equations
xt+1 = Atxt +B
i
tu
i
t +
∑
j∈n
B
j
tu
j⋆
t
J(ui) =
1
2
T∑
t=t
(xTt+1Q
i
t+1xt+1 + u
iT
t R
i
tu
i
t); R
i
t = R
iT
t > 0, Q
i
t+1 = Q
iT
t+1 ≥ 0
(57)
Then the Nash Equilibrium or equivalently the condition for optimality is
given by solution of the set of relations
ui⋆t = −P
i
tS
i
t+1Atx
⋆
t − P
i
t (s
i
t+1 + S
i
t+1
∑
i∈n
Bitu
i⋆
t )
P it = [R
ii
t +B
iT
t S
i
t+1B
i
t]
−1BiTt
Sit = Q
i
t + A
T
t S
i
t+1[I − B
i
tP
i
tS
i
t+1]At; S
i
t+1 = Q
i
t+1
sit = A
T
t [I −B
i
tP
i
tS
i
t+1]
T [sit+1 + S
i
t+1
∑
i∈n
Bitu
i⋆
t ]; s
i
t+1 = 0; i ∈ n
Furthermore the mimimum cost function is given by
J(ui⋆) =
T∑
t=1
xT⋆t A
T
t Q
i
t+1
(
−BitP
i
tQ
i
t+1Atx
⋆
t − B
i
tP
i
tQ
i
t+1
(∑
j∈n
B
j
tu
j⋆
t
)
+
(∑
j∈n
B
j
tu
j⋆
t
))
+
1
2
T∑
t=1

xTt ATt +
(∑
j∈n
B
j
tu
j⋆
t
)TQit+1P iTt (BiTt Qit+1Bit +Rit)P itQit+1
(
Atx
⋆
t +
(∑
j∈n
B
j
tu
j⋆
t
))
−
T∑
t=1

xTt ATt +
(∑
j∈n
B
j
tu
j⋆
t
)TQit+1P iTt BiTt Qit+1
(∑
j∈n
B
j
tu
j⋆
t
)
+
1
2
T∑
t=1
(∑
j∈n
B
j
tu
j⋆
t
)T
Qit+1
(∑
j∈n
B
j
tu
j⋆
t
)
+
1
2
T∑
t=1
[
xT⋆ATt Q
i
t+1Atx
⋆
t
]
(58)
There is a slight abuse of notation by denoting the end time and the
transpose of a matrix by the same letter ’T’
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Proof. From the Minimization Theorem we have the associated Hamiltonian
function as
H it =
1
2
T∑
t=1
[xTt+1Q
i
t+1xt+1 + u
iT
t R
i
tu
i
t] + p
iT
t+1
(
Atxt +B
i
tu
i
t +
(∑
j∈n
B
j
tu
j⋆
t
))
=
1
2
T∑
t=1


(
Atxt +B
i
tu
i
t +
∑
j∈n
B
j
tu
j
t
)T
Qit+1
(
Atxt +B
i
tu
i
t +
∑
j∈n
B
j
tu
j
t
)
+ uiTt R
i
tu
i
t


+ piTt+1
(
Atxt +B
i
tu
i
t +
(∑
j∈n
B
j
tu
j⋆
t
))
(59)
−piTt =
∂H it
∂xt
= (Atxt)
T
Qit+1At +
(
Bitu
i
t +
(∑
j∈n
B
j
tu
j⋆
t
))T
Qit+1At + p
iT
t+1At
= xTt A
T
t Q
i
t+1At +

uiTt BiTt +
(∑
j∈n
B
j
tu
j⋆
t
)TQit+1At + piTt+1At
(60)
Also,
0 =
∂H it
∂ui⋆t
=
(
Bitu
i
t
)T
Qit+1B
i
t +

xTt ATt +
(∑
j∈n
B
j
tu
j⋆
t
)TQit+1Bit + uiTt Rit + piTt+1Bit
= uiTt B
iT
t Q
i
t+1B
i
t +

xTt ATt +
(∑
j∈n
B
j
tu
j⋆
t
)TQt+1Bit + uiTt Rt + piTt+1Bit
(61)
Since piTt+1 = 0 we have,
uiTt
(
BiTt Q
i
t+1B
i
t +R
i
t
)
+ xTt A
T
t Q
i
t+1B
i
t +
(∑
j∈n
B
j
tu
j⋆
t
)T
Qit+1B
i
t = 0 (62)
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Taking the transpose of the above equation we have,
BiTt Q
iT
t+1B
i
tu
i
t +B
iT
t Q
iT
t+1
[
Atxt +
(∑
j∈n
B
j
tu
j⋆
t
)]
+RiTt u
i
t = 0 (63)
Simplifying and solving for uit we have
uit = −
[
RiTt +B
iT
t Q
i
t+1B
i
t
]
−1
BiTt
[
Qit+1Atxt +Q
i
t+1
(∑
j∈n
B
j
tu
j⋆
t
)]
(64)
This gives the optimal control for the player i. So we write it as
ui⋆t = −
[
RiTt +B
iT
t Q
i
t+1B
i
t
]−1
BiTt
[
Qit+1Atx
⋆
t +Q
i
t+1
(∑
j∈n
B
j
tu
j⋆
t
)]
Replacing the value of P it =
[
RiTt +B
iT
t Q
i
t+1B
i
t
]−1
BiTt , Q
i
t+1 = S
i
t+1, s
i
t+1 = 0 from
the definitions we have,
ui⋆t = −P
i
t
[
Sit+1Atx
⋆
t + S
i
t+1
(∑
j∈n
B
j
tu
j⋆
t
)
+ sit+1
]
ui⋆t = −P
i
tS
i
t+1Atx
⋆
t − P
i
t
(
sit+1 + S
i
t+1
(∑
j∈n
B
j
tu
j⋆
t
))
Now we go ahead to find the minimum cost for player i. We have,
J(ui⋆) =
1
2
T∑
t=1
(xT⋆t+1Q
i
t+1x
⋆
t+1 + u
iT⋆
t R
i
tu
i⋆
t )
Replacing the value of x⋆t+1 from the state updation law we have the above expression as,
=
1
2
T∑
t=1
[

xT⋆t ATt + uiT⋆t BTt +
(∑
j∈n
B
j
tu
j⋆
t
)TQit+1
(
Atx
⋆
t +B
i
tu
i⋆
t +
(∑
j∈n
B
j
tu
j⋆
t
))
+ uiT⋆t R
i
tu
i⋆
t ]
=
1
2
T∑
t=1
[xT⋆t A
T
t Q
i
t+1Atx
⋆
t + 2x
T⋆
t A
T
t Q
i
t+1
(
Bitu
i⋆
t +
(∑
j∈n
B
j
tu
j⋆
t
))
+

uiT⋆t BiTt +
(∑
j∈n
B
j
tu
j⋆
t
)TQit+1
(
Bitu
i⋆
t +
(∑
j∈n
B
j
tu
j⋆
t
))
+ uiT⋆t R
i
tu
i⋆
t ]
(65)
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Puting the value of the solved ui⋆t in the avove equation we have J(u
i⋆) as
=
1
2
T∑
t=1
[
xT⋆ATt Q
i
t+1Atx
⋆
t
]
+
T∑
t=1
xT⋆t A
T
t Q
i
t+1
(
−BitP
i
tQ
i
t+1Atx
⋆
t − B
i
tP
i
tQ
i
t+1
(∑
j∈n
B
j
tu
j⋆
t
)
+
(∑
j∈n
B
j
tu
j⋆
t
))
+
1
2
T∑
t=1

x⋆Tt ATt Qit+1P iTt +
(∑
j∈n
B
j
tu
j⋆
t
)T
Qt+1P
iT
t+1

(BiTt Qit+1Bit +Rit)
(
P itQ
i
t+1Atx
⋆
t + P
i
tQ
i
t+1
(∑
j∈n
B
j
tu
j⋆
t
))
−
T∑
t=1

x⋆Tt ATt Qit+1P iTt +
(∑
j∈n
B
j
tu
j⋆
t
)T
Qit+1P
iT
t

BiTt Qit+1
(∑
j∈n
B
j
tu
j⋆
t
)
+
1
2
T∑
t=1
(∑
j∈n
B
j
tu
j⋆
t
)T
Qit+1
(∑
j∈n
B
j
tu
j⋆
t
)
(66)
which on simplifying produces the result in the statement of the problem.
Coming back to the discussion of Discrete Time H∞ control and matrix
Riccati equations we attempt to provide a solution of equations (38) and
(39). Thereafter we try to find the values of γ satisfying these two equations,
this problem is dealt numerically.
8 Solution of matrix Riccati equations
For the sake of convenience we again present the neccessary matrix equations
to solve equations (38) and (39) in this section. As we deal with Infinite
Horizon case the stationary versions of all the equations in the previous
subsection are obtained by removing the index t or t+1 to all matrix-valued
symbols. Rewriting the necessary matrix equations in time independent form
we have,
A¯ = A− BR−1P T , A˜ = A− LTN−1C (67)
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where R = GTG, P = HTG, L = EDT , N = EET .
Along with the additional notations
Γ = (S−1 +BR−1BT − γ−2M)−1
S¯ = A¯T (S − γ−2M)−1A¯ +Q− PR−1P T
∆ = (Σ−1 + CTNC − γ−2Q)−1
Σ˜ = A˜(Σ−1 − γ−2Q)−1A˜T +M − LTN−1L
(68)
Then the two matrix Riccati equations needed for our purpose can be written
as
S = A¯TΓA¯+Q− PR−1P T (69)
Σ = A˜∆A˜T +M − LTN−1L (70)
where Q = HTH , M = DDT
A tedious calculation leads us to the solution of equations (69) and (70) given
by
[A−BG−1H ]S−1[A−BG−1H ]T = S−1 + (BG−1)(BG−1)T − γ−2DDT
(71)
[A−DE−1C]TΣ−1[A−DE−1C] = Σ−1 + (E−1C)T (E−1C)− γ−2HTH
(72)
As the above two equations are not easily solvable symbolically we tame the
problem numerically by assuming numerical values for the matrices. For our
purpose we take the matrices as
A =
[
1 0
0 1
]
, B = C = D = E = G = H =
[
0 1
1 0
]
(73)
Puting the above values in equations (71) and (72) we have,
[
1 −1
−1 1
]
S−1
[
1 −1
−1 1
]T
= S−1 +
[
1 0
0 1
]
[1− γ−2] (74)
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Let S−1 =
[
a b
c d
]
. Solving the above equation we get
a =
1
3
[γ−2 − 1], b =
2
3
[γ−2 − 1], c =
2
3
[γ−2 − 1], d =
1
3
[γ−2 − 1]
Therefore S−1 = γ
−2
−1
3
[
1 2
2 1
]
and S = 3
γ−2−1
[
−1 2
2 −1
]
. Similarly solution
for Σ gives Σ−1 = γ
−2
−1
3
[
1 2
2 1
]
and Σ = 3
γ−2−1
[
−1 2
2 −1
]
.
To arrive at a range for γ we have the following conditions
ρ(MS) < γ2 and ρ(Σ˜S) < γ2
or
ρ(ΣQ) < γ2 and ρ(ΣS¯) < γ2
(75)
where ’ρ’ stands for spectral radius or the largest eigenvalue of the matrices
in the argument.
8.1 Calculation of Spectral Radius
ρ(MS) = ρ
(
1
γ−2 − 1
[
−1 2
2 −1
])
=
3
1− γ−2
ρ(Σ˜S) = ρ
(
18
(1− γ−2)(1− 4γ−2)
[
1 −1
−1 1
])
=
18
(1− 4γ−2)(1− γ−2)
ρ(ΣQ) = ρ
(
1
γ−2 − 1
[
−1 2
2 −1
])
=
3
1− γ−2
ρ(ΣS¯) = ρ
(
6(γ−4 − γ−2 − 1)
(1− γ−2 + γ−4)2 − 4
[
1 −1
−1 1
])
=
6(γ−4 − γ−2 − 1)
(1− γ−2 + γ−4)2 − 4
(76)
For γ to satisfy the Riccati equations we have,
ρ(MS) < γ2 or
3
1− γ−2
< γ2
and
ρ(Σ˜S) < γ2 or
18
(1− 4γ−2)(1− γ−2)
< γ2
(77)
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OR
ρ(ΣQ) < γ2 or
3
1− γ−2
< γ2
and
ρ(ΣS¯) < γ2 or
6(γ−4 − γ−2 − 1)
(1− γ−2 + γ−4)2 − 4
< γ2
(78)
From the first equation of equation (77) for γ > 0 we have γ > 2 and from
second equation of equation (77) for γ > 0 we have γ > 4.78 or γ > .42.
Combining the above conditions we have γ > 4.78 or γ > 2
From the first equation of equation (78) for γ > 0 we have γ > 2 and from
second equation of equation (78) for γ > 0 we have γ < 1.48. Combining we
do not get any range for γ.
9 Conclusion and problems in future
We try to conclude the article with a brief discussion and open problems.
In our work we have revealed a new face for differential calculus where it is
shown the well known properties of conventional matrix product could still be
applied while doing the differential calculus for Semi-Tensor product(STP)
of matrices. While the rich ideas of Boolean Calculus[36] are still present we
have shown that(STP) formalism can also be a new addition in the existing
ideas of matrix differential calculus and it can be applied to Boolean net-
works. While the ideas of STP formalism are still developing our technique
can be a new addition in the existing formalism. This may open up new re-
search avenues in matrix differential calculus. The idea of implementing the
Markov Decision Process theory in Boolean Networks is an absolutely new
addition. While deriving the optimal control for the Boolean networks we
have shown that at optimal condition the system falls into a cycle where the
optimal control values and the state trajectory values are repeated at each
discrete time. This is a new finding on which further research can be carried
out. In our second part of the discussion that is Game Based Control we
have derived the optimal control and the optimal cost in a thought problem
through Pontryagin Minimization Principle. While dealing with H∞ opti-
mal control for discrete time systems for infinite horizon problem involving
the time independent matrices, we showed an absolutely new technique for
solving the equations by considering delta variations of the state equation
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and eventually replacing the delta variations by differentials which made the
equations much easier to handle. Also the matrix Riccati equations that
came up were solved successfully by considering special values of the matri-
ces. Finally we derive a range for the attenuation level γ and draw an ending
line on the tedious calculations.
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